On June 23, 2026, the Journal du Cameroun published an unequivocal diagnosis: 77 board chairpersons (PCA) and 35 chief executives (DG) are holding office in violation of the legal framework. In a country where more than 306,000 public servants deliver state services, these irregularities represent a structural flaw that threatens the credibility of the administrative apparatus.
The mandate of a board chairperson or a chief executive is governed by the Public Procurement Code and civil service regulations, which set limits on term length and require transparent appointment procedures. Yet many of these mandates exceed the legal thresholds, with some officials being reappointed indefinitely without competitive bidding or parliamentary validation. This practice creates a double illegality: it breaches appointment rules and deprives the state of its right to budgetary oversight.
The repercussions are multiple. First, the misallocation of public resources, each illegal mandate generating unjustified management expenses that bloat the state budget without corresponding performance. Second, the erosion of citizens’ trust, as they see public services weakened by leaders whose legitimacy is in question. Finally, the risk of a corruption spiral, where continuity of posts becomes a privilege reserved for a narrow circle of political actors.
Viviane Ondoua Biwole, an expert in public management, points to the roots of this phenomenon: political patronage that favours the appointment of acquaintances, the weakness of oversight bodies such as the Court of Auditors, and the absence of effective sanctions. She notes that the legislative framework, although comprehensive, remains under‑utilised due to a lack of political will and rigorous monitoring.
For the Cameroonian citizen, the most tangible consequence is the degradation of service quality. Whether in health, education or infrastructure, the presence of illegal leaders slows projects, delays reforms and raises costs for users. The sense of injustice translates into a growing disengagement from public institutions.
In response, the researcher proposes three reform axes: first, the establishment of a mandatory digital register of appointments, accessible to the public and oversight bodies; second, the introduction of proportionate administrative sanctions, including immediate dismissal and repayment of undue salaries; third, the strengthening of Parliament’s role in validating mandates to ensure continuous parliamentary supervision.
The stakes are clear: without a profound re‑examination of the appointment system, Cameroon risks widening the gap between the state and its citizens. Viviane Ondoua Biwole’s recommendations provide a roadmap, but their implementation will depend on the authorities’ ability to transcend partisan interests in favour of transparent and accountable governance.
